The objective within the study is to evaluate the modalities of the Chinese power projection, within the country´s strategy to gain access to develop crude reserves in developing countries. Liberal Institutionalist perspectives upon the concept of power are applied as the central theoretical framework for analysing the Chinese performance in the cases of energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, Angola and Venezuela. A strong reliance upon tangible power resources as material inducement is identified as an essential part of the Chinese energy strategy. This also serves as a necessary pre-condition for the establishment of channels through which intangible power resources can be applied. Key Words: China; Natural recourses; Energy; Oil; Power.
INTRODUCTION
The objective within the present study is to evaluate the modalities of the Chinese power projection, as part of the country´s strategy to gain access to develop crude reserves in developing countries. Thereby, the aim of the analysis is to understand how the application power recourses becomes evident in particular Chinese interactions with crude producers.
The article departs from the hypothesis that the exercise of power, as part of the Chinese recourse acquisition strategy, is a multifaceted process, through which a range of interrelated power recourses become activated. The liberal institutionalist perspective serves as the central theoretical framework for the study. The notion of power is treated through conceptualizations by Joseph Nye (1990; 2004; combined with Zhimin Chen and Lulu Chang´s (2013) further elaborations of this. The article is structured as a case study, within which recent Chinese relations with Kazakhstan, Angola and Venezuela are reviewed in order to be able to classify the Chinese power projection with regards to the different conceptual dimensions, to which it relates. A parallel objective is to assess the consistency between 1) the fundamental Chinese foreign policy goals, 2) the country´s strategy regarding energy related cooperation and obtainment, as well as 3) the specific tactics applied in the source countries examined. A strong reliance upon tangible power resources for material inducement is identified, as an essential part of the Chinese energy strategy. This however,
should not be understood as being in contrast to or as incompatible with measures of soft power inducement, but rather as a necessary pre-condition for the establishment of channels through which intangible power resources can -and have -been applied.
POWER AND ITS EVOLVING DIMENSIONS
The Chinese strategy for overseas resource acquisition and the modality of power which the country employs in line with this must be evaluated, in relation to the constantly changing structural opportunities for the exercise of power, within the present global scenario. As a leading liberal-institutional scholar, Joseph Nye has elaborated the evolving nature of power, in a series of productions since the end of the cold war. In his work from 1990, Bound to Lead, Joseph Nye emphasizes how power has become less coercive, less fungible and less tangible (NYE, 1990 ). This is due to an increasing complexity of international politics, which means that a strong overall leverage which one country enjoys in relation to another will not necessarily translate into the former being able to shape the outcome of an issue, within which the later also has a stake (NYE 1990, p.175) . Increasing interdependence is also a factor which limits the options for successful coercive power application, thus, in many instances rendering measures based upon attraction, as the most efficient strategy (Ibid, . In his later work from 2004, Soft power: the Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye operates with the concept of power divided into hard power and soft power; whereas hard power rests on the material capability to command or induce and is associated with tangible resources, soft power is constituted by intangible
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resources such as co-option and agenda setting (NYE 2004, p.7) . Nye (2011) similarly underlines that hard power resources contain both the potential for coercion as well as attraction, depending upon their mode of application (NYE 2011, p.16 ). Soft power, on the other hand is defined as "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes." (Ibid, . Different power resources are also related to certain types of goals. Soft power is particularly useful for shaping an environment according to preferred norms of interaction, whereas hard power often proves to be more effective in obtaining more specific and tangible objectives, -a category within which Nye counts the acquisition of natural resources (Ibid p.16). The notion of smart power constitutes one of Nye´s most recent elaborations of the general concept. With this, Nye questions the idea that the possession of power recourses necessarily will lead the wielder to obtain his/her preferred outcomes in a ratio proportional to the amount of power applied. The process of power application by itself constitutes a vital intermediate link, which is analyzed with particular regards to essential questions such as the preferred outcome, recourses available in the given context, the positions of objects sought influenced, which type of power is more likely to be useful, and finally, with what probability? (Ibid, . Nye thereby ''opens'' the concept of power to become more dependent upon relational and contextual complexities.
Adapting Joseph Nye´s conceptualizations of the differentiated nature of power into an
operational framework, used to analyze the contemporary Chinese power projection within the international system, Chen and Chang (2013) elaborate this through a model containing the dimensions of attraction versus coercion, referring to the mode of power application, and material versus non-material, referring to the nature of power resources (CHEN & CHANG 2013, p.10) . Attraction can thereby rely on both material resources, -soft hardpower -as well as non-material resources -soft soft-power. The same way, coercion can both take place through non-material means, as well as by the application of material resources, or rather, through hard soft-power or hard hard-power, as illustrated in figure 1 below:
In the case of China, the authors nevertheless underline that the country by and large tends to rely on attraction rather than coercion, ascribing this circumstance to the country´s tradition of ´peaceful diplomacy´ (Ibid p.18). Regarding Chinese resource acquisition abroad, which mostly takes place far from its military sphere of influence, it is also logical that an analysis of the modalities of the country´s power application related to this purpose, must focus upon measures of attraction, as coercion must be presumed to be an inefficient strategy, under the present conditions.
From the constructivist perspective, the liberal-institutional perception of power has been criticized for "falling into the realist trap" of basically accepting the materialist nature of power, while still reserving some space for a "relative autonomous" essence of ideational power. Alexander Wendt stresses the importance of turning attention towards the discursive conditions shaping the perceptions related to, -and thereby the essential nature of the exercise of -power. Emphasis is thereby laid upon how the differing contexts of meaning shape the causal outcome of materialist explanations (WENDT 1999, pp. 135-137) . In line with this argument, the intention in the following analysis is thereby also to assess how the "perceptual reception" of the Chinese application of power resources is bound to lead to different outcomes depending upon the normative and ideational context, within which they are effectuated.
Another question relates to whether it is indeed possible to characterize the great variety of different interactions between both private and public Chinese entities on the one Some relevant circumstances related to evaluating the connection between Chinese power projection and foreign energy acquisition objectives must be considered in the specific national context, within which it occurs. These are primarily concerned with 1) making the case that a multi-faceted power projection is at least in some degree related to the specific goal of accessing energy resources, and 2) distinguishing potentially "mercantilistic" aspects of Chinese energy companies and related entities behavior concerned with national energy security concerns, from ´normal´ market oriented behavior. The cases of Kazakhstan, Angola and Venezuela, which are revised in the course of the article, have been selected according to the denominator of all being countries in relation to which energy interests are central within the Chinese foreign policy planning. Consequently, a certain degree of presence of energy related concerns within a multifaceted power projection strategy, is presumed to be evident in the instances of interactions examined within Chinese engagement with energy providers. In instances when the application of varying power resources appear to significantly and persistently foment Chinese SOE´s access to energy sources, the strength and particular nature of this relationship can then be further elaborated, yet, without assuming a necessary "one-to-one" correlation.
Finally, country cases from different geographical contexts have been selected, due to the intention of identifying consistent features of the Chinese policies for energy foreign acquisition, independent of the influences of any specific regional geopolitical situation.
OIL STRATEGY WITHIN GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Since the end of the cold war, China has been adhering to certain fundamental policy prescriptions defining the country´s international engagement. In the late 1980íes the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping formulated the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle which refers to a policy of a very modest exposure of capabilities and keeping a low profile, as a central guideline for the Chinese international engagement (ZHAO 2013, p.103) . The notion of Yu Guoji Jiegui which can be characterized as the aspiration of ´linking up to the international track´ complemented these policies through the ambition of abiding to common norms of interaction and cooperation within the international society (XIAOYU 2012, p.355 ). An essential objective within this foreign policy orientation was to stride towards an international insertion, which would provide the necessary conditions for national development (SHAMBAUGH 2013, p.7; SUTTER 2012, p.12) . Since the mid 1980íes, a new strong emphasis was assigned to Jingji Waijiao -economic diplomacy -within Chinese foreign affairs (HAMRIN 1998, p.89) . In a speech in 1999, then Premier Minister Zhu Rongji established Zou Chuau -going out -as a prescriptive concept, referring to the need for resource entities and oil companies to create a solid international strategy for the overseas supply of such vital inputs for the growing Chinese economy (ECONOMY & MICHAEL 2014, p.49) . During the Jiang Zemin era, this also resulted in the Chinese state becoming increasingly involved in providing conditions which would spur such international engagement, through tax breaks, cheap credits and low interest funding (Ibid).
As has often been indicated by China specialists and pundits, the issue of resource Other central elements within Chinas foreign policy agenda, which in some measure also are related to the country's overseas energy acquisition have to do with the principle of non-intervention in internal political affairs, and its goal of a non-hegemonic world order.
The principle of non-intervention is clearly expressed within a Chinese whitepaper on Africa, wherein it is mentioned that China will seek to pursue developmental goals in cooperation with African countries, ´without setting any political conditions´ (CHINA GOV. 2010). Zhu
Liqun defends this principle by making the argument that the idea of non-interference is a natural product of a colonial history, which China and African countries share, also meaning that it thereby expresses a mutually shared perception, and thus cannot be perceived as unilaterally imposed by China (LIQUN 2010, p.43) . In effect, the anti-interventionist policy does clear some ground for energy related cooperation with authoritarian or repressive regimes, which western companies, at least in principle, should be more constrained from doing business with. The anti-hegemonism has paralleled the policies of modernization and international opening, since these were established by Deng Xiaoping (HAMRIN 1998, p.75) . The de-hegemonization of international affairs is an integral part of the notion of a harmonious world, and is thereby both a prescriptive goal within Chinese foreign policy, but also a descriptive concept referring to the perception of a more multi-polar world order in the 21st century (LIQUN 2010, p.27 ).
The principle of non-intervention as well as the idea of de-hegemonization imply an ideational framework with a certain co-optive potential, which at least should be considered with regards to the specific national context, within which they are interpreted.
Though the universalist appeal and emancipatory nature of these foreign policy doctrines can be questioned, they nonetheless may contain a certain degree of attraction, not only for ruling elites, but more importantly, a broader popular appeal, strongly related to colonialist experience and third world oriented ideology. As it is stressed by Xiaoyu, it becomes important to consider the role of non-western nations in shaping international norms, rather than an a-priori acceptance of the general validity of norms founded upon an occidental worldview (XIAOYU 2012, p.347) . The norms of non-intervention and de-hegemonization are also of a clearly intangible nature, and it is therefore presumed that they may imply a certain potential as a soft-power resource. Their effectiveness is subsequently to be evaluated in the specific country cases with regards to their possible influence on Chinas energy strategy.
CHINESE ENGAGEMENT I KAZAKHSTAN
China first became a net-importer of oil and gas in 1993 (JIAN 2011, p. 3), which roughly coincided with the disintegration of the USSR and thereby also the independence of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Since then, China has been expanding its ties with these areas on basis of the intrinsically intertwined twin objectives of assuring stability in its western border regions and obtaining energy supplies (SUTTER 2012, p.242 
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privilege helps to compensate Chinese companies for a more modest financial stance, than that enjoyed by many large IOCs (LIAO 2006, p.68).
POST-CONFLICT ANGOLA AND THE CHINESE ENTRANCE
Diplomatic ties between China and Angola span back to 1983, although a deeper have also taken place in cultural, educational and scientific fields (HONGBO 2014, p.651 ).
An essential point, which inevitably has smoothened general cooperation between China and Venezuela, has been the latter's firm support for the One-China policy. Of the modest sized group of states which fully recognize Taiwan the day today, 11 are to be found within the Central American and Caribbean Region. Though presently an informal understanding exists between China and Taiwan, regarding not to seek to actively push any nation to switch recognition, the issue continues to be of high importance to both countries. In this respect, Venezuela is in a key position for China, as the South American country exports subsidized oil within the Petrocaribe scheme, which benefits many of the countries recognizing Taiwan within the region, and thereby also constitutes a significant economic leverage for Caracas (ELLIS 2010, p.7) .
On the geostrategic level, Venezuela´s challenge to US hegemony within the region may also coincide with the general Chinese interests within the region, and thereby stimulates a certain Sino-Venezuelan alignment. This loosely shared worldview nevertheless covers over significant differences when translated into specific objectives by each country. An essential goal for China within Latin America is access to the region´s natural resources, but within this search, China has strictly avoided the costs of challenging the US within the region (SUTTER 2012, p.314 
CONCLUDING REMARKS UPON THE NATURE OF POWER AND CHINESE OIL ACQUISITIONS
As the analysis of the country cases indicates, the Chinese aspirations to access oil In the case of Venezuela, a certain degree of apparent ideological alignment and shared worldview, seems to have facilitated cooperation within the energy sector. The shared anti-hegemonic ideals and "Global South" political identity are worth mentioning as a ideational soft-power resources, which are likely to have facilitated energy cooperation. In the China-Venezuelan case, though, it is important to keep an eye on the contextual nature which has allowed this normative power capability to become evident: the political identity of the Venezuelan governments since 1999 and its opposition to the elements of the international system with roots in a occidental neo-liberal order. This has resulted in a high measure of proneness to Chinese engagement within the country, and Caracas in many respects appears to have been the active part, in trying to forge an ideological dimension to the economic complementarities between the two nations. In the Chinese strategy for international insertion, the foreign policy principles of keeping a low profile and of deideologization of the country´s foreign policy, seem to have overshadowed any possible interests in challenging US hegemony.
The indications that the Chinese projection of soft-hard power in Angola has produced a positive attitude towards China within some segments of society, also blurs the picture of what at first appears to be a very materialist Chinese energy strategy: soft-hard power application producing soft-soft power. Importantly, this raises the question of power dynamics as a reciprocal force, initially exercised by one party, but in the process of being absorbed by the other, transforming into another power domain and opening new channels for the projection of different power resources. This also paves the way for a more constructivist focus upon the culture which characterizes the interactions in a particular temporal and spatial context, rather than trying to deduce specific power resource variables which supposedly would shape the outcome of interactions. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether it is indeed possible to meaningfully try to separate the hard and soft nature of power, and whether the essential objective should not rather be to evaluate the conjunction of different channels activated in the attempts of power projection, some pertaining to the soft, others to the hard realm.
Joseph Nye (2011) does treat the complexities of the interconnection between hard and soft power through the notion of ´smart power´, within the strategies of both small and large states, and also proves that these historically tend to be complementary forces. Though the cases examined within this paper indicate the presence of some modest soft-power projection, they generally conclude that the Chinese strategy in relation to oil rich countries, relies heavily on materialist inducement in the form of tangible power resources. In this regard, the development over time is an aspect which has been difficult to examine, because of the relatively recentness of the strong Chinese engagement in obtaining natural resources abroad. This poses two relevant questions: the first relates to whether economic interactions actually provide an initial and necessary basis, upon which an institutionalized cooperation and, eventually, channels for ideational and cultural interactions and influence subsequently will emerge? The second question relates to whether the imbalances inherent in the economic asymmetries and diverging strategic exceptions, in the case of Venezuela, or the tensions which the strong sudden presence of China in Angola has provoked in some parts of society, are indeed rendering a pragmatically materialist focused power projection strategy as an attractive option in the long run? This issue leads attention towards complexities inherent in the process of power exercise, which lie at the hearth of Nye´s notion of smart power. In line with this approach, the first question to ask would be related to Chinas preferred outcome from its interactions with oil providers, while other central queries would be concerned with context, the preferences of partners and the probabilities of success. From the previous analysis it stands clear that the application of available power recourses, in the existing context, has been successful in providing energy recourses in the intermediate term.
Yet, whether the complicated principle of non-intervention or the often diffuse ''southern common identity'' is indeed a stable basis for China´s relations with its offshore providers, stands as a very open question. If China seeks to make these initial commercial contacts constitute the foundation for deeper future cooperation, it might find it necessary to consider its own interests more closely together with those of its partners. As the Chinese foreign oil dependence does not appear to be diminishing within any near future, the feedback from the initial experiences of acquiring this resource abroad, should imply valuable knowledge for defining a more sustainable long-term relationship with overseas providers. [Available from: http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/the-oil-factor-in-
